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On the Causal Relationship between Government 




This paper applies the technique of Granger Causality to determine the 
relationship between total government expenditures and total tax revenue using annual 
revised estimates. The analysis discovers a firm unidirectional effect from expenditure to 
revenue suggesting the preference of controlling the spending decisions to reduce the 
tax revenue-expenditure deficit. 
JEL Classification: E620 
Introduction 
There has always been a debate among economists about the intertemporal 
association between taxation and government expenditure. This discussion is vital since it 
corroborates the size of government, budget deficit and the structure of taxation and 
expenditure themselves. In studying the causal relationship between taxation and 
expenditure, three possibilities may arise: Expenditure may change (1) simultaneously with 
tax revenues (2) after the commencement of revenue streams, or (3) before revenues. The 
first situation is a case where voters of a society take a joint decision vis-à-vis the desired 
level of taxes and spending together and thereby weigh the costs and benefits of any 
change in the balanced budget. This case of fiscal synchronization is observed to the 
extent where expenditure changes are balanced by contemporaneous taxation. Situation 
(2) is the case where revenues lead and control the spending decisions. In this case, the 
ways and means of collecting taxes are driven mainly by political  and/or institutional 
jurisdictions and thereby preferred over economic efficiency, the decision of expenditures 
is a case followed by the revenue decision. Argument (3) can be thought of as a pro-
Keynesian case where deficit budgeting is advocated to boost employment, consumption, 
saving and production and then the revenue inflows are determined through increased tax 
revenues
1. Nonetheless, a possible cause of the failure of this theory in most of the 
developing countries would be a heavy reliance on consumption expenditures rather than 
investment expenditures. Furthermore, this argument can be supported by another 
empirical matter; spending decisions are also based on political will. It is argued that if the 
political majority can deliver expenditure alterations, it will be reflected on the tax side as an 
aftermath. 
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The Government of Pakistan collects the major portion of revenue through taxes and 
surcharges which constitute 65% to 70% of overall revenue collection. The rising gap 
between total expenditure and total tax revenue has always been a concern of many 
economists and policymakers. This gap was Rs. 150 billion in 1991 when the Resource 
Mobilisation & Tax Reform Commission was established. In 2003, this gap widened to Rs. 
515 billion which can be seen from Figure-1. Moreover, it is an empirical fact that most of 
the tax revenues were deposited to consumption expenditures rather than investment 
expenditures and this could be a primary cause of this continuously sprouting tax-
expenditure gap.  
Figure-1: Government Expenditure and Tax Revenue 
 
In this paper, an attempt is made to gauge the primary reasoning of the budget 
deficit we have been facing. This has been done by estimating the causal relationship 
between Total Expenditure and Tax Revenue.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section (I) is dedicated to the literature 
review, Section (II) illustrates the methodology and data, Section (III) explains the empirical 
results and major findings and finally Section (IV) concludes the study and presents some 
policy implications.  
I.  Review of Selected Literature  
The hypotheses of “tax then spend”, “spend then tax” and “tax or spend and spend 
or tax” are all supported by the economic studies regarding different economies. Thus we 
can classify these studies with respect to the first, second and third hypothesis. 
Furthermore, a careful examination of these studies reveals that the development stages of 
a country is nothing or very little to do with the direction of causality as noted by Cheng 
(1999). 
For instance, Friedman (1972, 1978) supports the view that increasing taxes means 
that one would have just as large a deficit but at a higher level of government expenditures. 
To him, the direction of causality is from tax revenues to government spending. Buchanan 
and Wagner (1977) also substantiate this result. In their view, the budget deficit is a   3
primary cause of increased government expenditures. If the government is to finance this 
deficit entirely through direct taxes, demand for restraining the expenditures would be 
called for by the society. Blackley (1986) also showed that increasing revenue leads to 
increased expenditures thus the smaller deficit is ruled out. Manage and Marlow (1986) 
find the unidirectional causality running from federal receipts to expenditures. However, 
they criticised the Reagan administration’s deficit reduction packages which emphasised 
the tax increase over deficit reduction pointing out that these packages were designed to 
reallocate the combination of various revenue sources without concentrating on aggregate 
spending levels. Marlow and Manage (1987) studied this relationship in state and local 
government finances of the United States. The Granger test detects that tax receipts cause 
expenditure for state governments. However, there is no significant relationship found 
between these two variables in local governments. Owoye (1995) conducted a study of G7 
countries and finds that the direction of causality runs from tax revenues to government 
expenditures in the case of Japan and Italy. Cheng (1999) in a study of eight Latin 
American countries detects a similar direction for Columbia, the Dominican Republic, 
Honduras and Paraguay.  
On the contrary, Barro (1974), Peacock and Wiseman (1979) support the other view 
that increased taxes and borrowings are due to increased government expenditures. In 
their view, it is the political system of a country which decides how much to spend and then 
finds the resources to finance this spending. Developing countries such as Pakistan 
apparently face this situation. Moreover, continuous need for social sector reforms also 
requires increased development expenditures. This result is further supported by 
Anderson, et. al. (1986) who test this hypothesis in the context of the U.S. economy, 1946-
1983 using multivariate analysis. Furstenberg et. al. (1986) examined the intertemporal 
relationship using the VAR model. Their analysis revealed that tax revenues are followed 
by the decisions of spending: a support for “spend now and tax later” hypothesis. 
Furthermore, Manage and Marlow (1986) find the presence of bidirectional 
causality between U.S. federal revenues and expenditures for 1929-82. This bidirectional 
causality is found in more than half the states. Joulfaian and Mookerjee (1990) also support 
both tax-and-spend & spend-and-tax hypotheses. Owoye (1995) confirms this result in G7 
countries excluding Japan and Italy. Cheng (1999) also identifies this feedback mechanism 
in Chile, Panama, Brazil, and Peru. This bidirectional causality is also prominent in the 
case of Indian states, as Bhat, K. Sham et. al. (1993) revealed.  
II.  Methodology and Data 
In this paper we use the Granger test of causality (1969) to study the causal 
relationship between Government Spending and Tax Revenues. It states that a variable TR 
Granger-cause GE if the prediction of GE is improved solely by the past values of TR and 
not by other series included in the analysis. Vice versa is true for GE Granger-causing TR. 
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Where GE is Total Government Expenditures, TR is Tax Revenue and u1 and u2 are 
white-noise residuals. We will test the hypotheses Ho: ￿ai = 0 and Ho: ￿ di = 0 respectively 
for both the equations. If both the hypotheses are subject to rejection, then we can conclude 
the presence of feedback effect between GE and TR. And if only one of the hypotheses is 
subject to rejection, we can construe the unidirectional causality from that variable to the 
independent variable of the equation. Furthermore, we also anticipate that ￿ai<1, ￿ ß i<1, 
￿li<1 and ￿ d i<1.        
In addition, the Granger Causality test is very sensitive to the selection of lags of 
independent and dependent variables. Some previous studies like Anderson  et. al., 
(1986); Manage and Marlow (1986); Joulfaian and Mookerjee (1990); Baghestani and 
McNown (1994) arbitrarily choose the lag lengths. This arbitrary choice can not be justified 
a priori and could generate biased results. As Lee (1997) points out the practice of 
choosing similar lag length could be a potential model misspecification. One may argue 
that the political and economic history of a country would appropriately elucidate at what 
year one variable is causing the other. However, to keep oneself from model 
misspecification in a situation where one is not sure as to what lag to use, some alternative 
measures would have to be acquired. Therefore, a more proper technique of best-lag 
selection is adopted using the modus operandi defined here: In our approach, we use the 
Akaike Information Criterion (1969) a nd Schwarz Criterion (1978) to determine the 
appropriate lag lengths for GE and TR. Both these tests suggest that a model with the least 
value of AIC and/or SC should be chosen. This selection process follows this way: first we 
regress GE on the lags of GE excluding TR from where the best lag(s) is determined. 
Second, using these lags for GE, we start including lags of TR in the regression so that the 
suitable lag(s) for TR would be determined. It is the procedure for selecting appropriate lag 
lengths for b oth variables in equation (1) and the same methodology is adopted for 
equation (2). We use Normal, First-differenced and Log series for our analysis and the 
results of AIC and SC for these three series are reported in Tables 2a, 3a and 4a 
respectively. First-differenced series is a good instrument to get rid of any nonstationarity 
problem and Log series is used to minimise the variance. It is also worthwhile notifying that 
Schwarz Criterion is a better measure of choosing lag lengths since it imposes a harsher 
penalty of adding more restrictions; {see Gujarati (2003) for details}. In our analysis, both 
AIC and SC depict the same conclusion for most of the cases. Otherwise we use SC for 
the reason defined above. Similarly, Tables 2b, 3b and 4b show the results of Granger Test 
respectively for three series. 
We use the data for these two variables in real terms (we use GDP deflator as the 
general price level) from 1973 to 2003. These are revised estimates taken from various 
issues of Federal Budgets in the Briefs. Total Government Expenditures constitute Federal 
Current Expenditures, Provincial Current Expenditures and Annual Development 
Programme. Similarly, Total Tax Revenue constitutes Federal Direct & Indirect Taxes and 
Total Provincial Taxes.   5
III.  Empirical Results 
Table-1 sums up the results of the Granger test for all three series. It can be seen 
that we essentially face unidirectional causality running from Government Expenditure to 
Tax Revenues. Moreover, Tax Revenue responds quickly to the changes in Government 
Expenditure. This would fundamentally be the case where government expenditures are 
determined through political manipulation and then the financial sources are searched to 
finance these expenditures. In the Pakistani context, Total (federal, provincial combined) 
Current Expenditures were Rs.700 billion during 2002, rose up to Rs. 792 billion last year 
showing an increase of 13%. On the other hand, Development Expenditures were Rs.126 
billion in 2002, increased up to Rs. 130 billion portraying a jump of only 3%. It clearly shows 
the government preferences and points out the areas where current expenditures need to 
be heavily shrunk. These include defense expenditures, debt servicing and general 
administration. The demand for defense expenditure is quite high for whatever reason. 
Furthermore, this spending has, explicitly or implicitly, been one of the main preferences for 
any regime, whether military or democratic. Similarly, spending on general administration 
is predominantly the expenses on bureaucracy and include extensive compensations which 
tends to increase the size of the government while it is an empirical fact that little 
government is always good government. Debt servicing is another major part of our total 
expenditure outlays. All these expenditures have been priority spending over the years in 
Pakistan and, despite attempts to be contained now, still compose the major part of total 
spending. It can be argued that the heavy reliance on these expenditures is not only 
certainly against pro-Keynesian theory but also imperative to increase the budget deficit.  
Table-1: Summary of Results for Granger Causality Test 
Normal Series  First-differenced 
Series 
Log Series 
TR does Not Cause GE 
 
GE causes TR at 1
st Lag 
TR does Not Cause GE 
 
GE causes TR at 3
rd Lag 
TR does Not Cause GE 
 
GE causes TR at 1
st Lag 
Furthermore, it has been argued several times that we have had very compact 
allocations for development expenditures. In times of political mayhem and military 
tensions, the axe always hits development outlays to fill the gaps in current expenditures. 
The main channels to sponsor these expenditures are the introduction of fresh taxes, 
raising the existing tax rates and borrowings. Governments tended to be involved in these 
practices without precisely considering the affiliated costs, not by monetary means but by 
welfare aspects. Secondly, due to the narrow tax base, evasion and inefficient 
implementation, collection never occurred as expected and needed. Thirdly, as stated 
herein above, the revenues raised through taxes mostly went to finance consumption 
expenditures. 
Nonetheless, looking at the causality results, we have two simultaneous solutions. 
First, increasing the tax base and making sure of proper tax collection avoiding misuse 
and leakages. Second, now that the governments start focusing on these issues, besides    
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finding new sources to finance these expenditures, there is a need for a gradual shifting 
from excess current expenditures towards development overheads. 
Moreover, since in this study GE is causing TR, it can be claimed that decreasing 
expenditure can also decrease revenues. Nevertheless, it may be argued that since not all 
(rather, few) expenditures are investment spending, if we decrease the consumption 
expenditures together with the increase in revenue collection which can be justified on 
economic grounds, the result will certainly be against this claim.  
The reader may also presume that since in this study  GE is not found to be 
dependent on TR, only increasing the tax revenues may tend to reduce the budget deficit. 
This is rather a difficult question to answer as well as a very strong assumption that could 
not be suggested only considering the causal relationship between these two variables, 
which is the basic element of this study. What we need is the ‘effect’ analysis of all the 
expenditures and revenues separately and in aggregate. Precisely, we need proper cost-
benefit analyses of any changes in taxation and expenditures if we are to address the 
problem of the federal deficit.  
IV. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
In this study, the causal relationship between Total Expenditures and Tax Revenue 
has been analysed. In general, our results support the Barro hypothesis that government 
expenditure causes revenues. The result that TR does not cause GE can best and only be 
explained by the political economy of Pakistan where the main expenditures are the outlays 
chiefly determined politically by bureaucratic and military influence (defense, debt 
servicing, general administration). Most of these consumption expenditures pose self 
and/or group interests rather than overall welfare. Although debt servicing is a liability 
transfer from previous periods, it is included here too because the debts taken have not 
been reflected in increased development and other investment expenditure over the years 
and have arguably been used for self interests rather than communal welfare by politicians. 
For that matter, a major portion of development expenditure in Pakistan is the residual 
amount left over from different consumption expenditure heads in provincial accounts (Net 
Capital Receipts, Net Public Account Receipts, for instance). Whenever the political need 
(or greed) of consumption expenditure is higher, there is little left as residual to self-finance 
the development expenditure by provinces.  
Furthermore, seeing that our tests can not guarantee the final benchmark resolution 
of the issue of reducing the deficit, we can obviously not support increasing tax revenues 
over decreasing expenditure. Only reducing the expenditures can not solely be acclaimed; 
rather, what we need primarily is (i) reduction in the size of large consumption outlays and 
their shifting towards development and other investment expenditures, thereby moving 
towards Pareto optimal solutions. In addition, the presence of and dependence on the 
political factors in determining the preferences for expenditures can interrupt any economic 
step taken to correct for the revenue-expenditure gap. Therefore, (ii) in determining the new 
outlays, economic efficiency should be preferred over political determination.    7
In addition, as is the focal point of this paper, results suggest that besides the Tax & 
Tariff Reform programme of the government which emerged and was enhanced during the 
90s, we strongly need an expenditure reform curriculum in which comprehensive cost-
benefit analyses should be conducted for government expenditures together with the 
analyses of adopting optimal approach for gradual shifting and reformation. This whole 
scenario should be scrutinized in a general equilibrium framework so that the effect and 
distributional consequences of any expenditure could be spread over the entire economy. 
Besides considering only the revenue generation from Tax and Tariff reforms, expenditure 
reforms analysis should be considered as the task that will determine the direction and 
deployment of revenue raised from Tax and Tariff Reforms. Once the optimal expenditures 















































TABLE – 2a 
Tests for Lag Selection using AIC & SC 


























AIC  SC 
1  -  11.53  11.63 
2  -  11.47  11.61 
3  -  11.48  11.67 
4  -  11.54  11.78 
2  1  11.52  11.71 
2  2  11.59  11.82 
2  3  11.70  11.99 
GE 
2  4  11.67  12.01 
-  1  9.47  9.56 
-  2  9.43  9.57 
-  3  9.50  9.69 
-  4  9.58  9.82 
1  1  9.36  9.50 
2  1  9.41  9.60 
3  1  9.50  9.74 
TR 
4  1  9.58  9.87 
 
TABLE – 2b 
Granger Causality Test Results between Total Expenditures (GE) and Tax Revenues (TR) using Table-2a 
 














GE  2  1  0.53  0.47  -  - 
TR  1  1  -  -  5.27  0.029 
Unidirectional 












TABLE – 3a 
Tests for Lag Selection using AIC & SC 


























AIC  SC 
1  -  11.40  11.49 
2  -  11.41  11.55 
3  -  11.46  11.66 
4  -  11.41  11.66 
1  1  11.47  11.61 
1  2  11.58  11.77 
1  3  11.53  11.77 
GE 
1  4  11.40  11.69 
-  1  9.39  9.48 
-  2  9.44  9.58 
-  3  9.51  9.70 
-  4  9.56  9.81 
1  1  9.45  9.59 
2  1  9.50  9.69 
3  1  9.32  9.56 
TR 
4  1  9.36  9.65 
 
TABLE – 3b 
Granger Causality Test Results between Total Expenditures (GE) and Tax Revenues (TR) using Table-3a 
 














GE  1  1  0.00  .99  -  - 
TR  3  1  -  -  3.7225  0.024 
Unidirectional 



















TABLE – 4a 
Tests for Lag Selection using AIC & SC 


























AIC  SC 
1  -  -2.89  -2.79 
2  -  -2.80  -2.66 
3  -  -2.82  -2.63 
4  -  -2.77  -2.53 
1  1  -2.89  -2.75 
1  2  -2.83  -2.64 
1  3  -2.83  -2.59 
GE 
1  4  -2.75  -2.46 
-  1  -3.28  -3.18 
-  2  -3.21  -3.07 
-  3  -3.21  -3.02 
-  4  -3.14  -2.90 
1  1  -3.32  -3.18 
2  1  -3.24  -3.05 
3  1  -3.21  -2.97 
TR 
4  1  -3.13  -2.84 
 
TABLE – 4b 
Granger Causality Test Results between Total Expenditures (GE) and Tax Revenues (TR) using Table-4a 
 














GE  1  1  1.998  .16  -  - 
TR  1  1  -  -  3.303  0.08 
Unidirectional 
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